Strategic Inaccuracy [pdf]
Abstract. When do political actors decide to engage in a conflict, and how accurately would a political actor want to learn about the prospective outcome given that others also receive the same information? I present a formal model in which two players with opposite preferences about an outcome decide whether to challenge each other and reveal the truth, or remain silent. Importantly, they receive a public signal before making the decision, and one player - the designer - can strategically choose how accurate this public signal is. The model shows that the designer may voluntarily choose to learn less information about the outcome even when she knows that doing so increases her chances of making a mistake. Additionally, even in extremely adversarial contexts, the designer sometimes optimally chooses a completely uninformative signal that leads to both players remaining silent in equilibrium, and both often prefer this silence over receiving perfect information. In the extension of the model, as in the recent literature on Bayesian persuasion and information design, I endow the designer with full flexibility in her choice of information. I find that this additional freedom can reduce the likelihood of conflict despite the innate divergence of interests between the players.
Abstract. When do political actors decide to engage in a conflict, and how accurately would a political actor want to learn about the prospective outcome given that others also receive the same information? I present a formal model in which two players with opposite preferences about an outcome decide whether to challenge each other and reveal the truth, or remain silent. Importantly, they receive a public signal before making the decision, and one player - the designer - can strategically choose how accurate this public signal is. The model shows that the designer may voluntarily choose to learn less information about the outcome even when she knows that doing so increases her chances of making a mistake. Additionally, even in extremely adversarial contexts, the designer sometimes optimally chooses a completely uninformative signal that leads to both players remaining silent in equilibrium, and both often prefer this silence over receiving perfect information. In the extension of the model, as in the recent literature on Bayesian persuasion and information design, I endow the designer with full flexibility in her choice of information. I find that this additional freedom can reduce the likelihood of conflict despite the innate divergence of interests between the players.
Bargaining for Longevity [pdf]
Abstract. This study explores the dynamics of resource allocation in partnerships where political actors have unequal bargaining power and are motivated by considerations of partnership longevity. I propose a theoretical framework in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability. In particular, I focus on the role of outside options in driving this trade-off; parties may choose to leave the agreement for an alternative partnership in each period. I show that there are conditions under which the proposer compromises more than half in equilibrium, which helps to understand why proposer advantage may not always be empirically observable. It follows that the partner with a higher outside option may in fact receive a lower offer and be worse off than a partner with a lower option. Further, with greater inequality - measured as the divergence in players' outside options - the proposer sometimes concedes more as her outside option improves, meaning that more inequality in bargaining strength may sometimes lead to less observed inequality. Lastly, it can be Pareto optimal that the proposer has and does not have the ability to leave the agreement.
Abstract. This study explores the dynamics of resource allocation in partnerships where political actors have unequal bargaining power and are motivated by considerations of partnership longevity. I propose a theoretical framework in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability. In particular, I focus on the role of outside options in driving this trade-off; parties may choose to leave the agreement for an alternative partnership in each period. I show that there are conditions under which the proposer compromises more than half in equilibrium, which helps to understand why proposer advantage may not always be empirically observable. It follows that the partner with a higher outside option may in fact receive a lower offer and be worse off than a partner with a lower option. Further, with greater inequality - measured as the divergence in players' outside options - the proposer sometimes concedes more as her outside option improves, meaning that more inequality in bargaining strength may sometimes lead to less observed inequality. Lastly, it can be Pareto optimal that the proposer has and does not have the ability to leave the agreement.
Coordination, Communication, and Compromise (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. We present a theory of coordination that compares communication and compromise. Using the "Battle of the Sexes" game as an example of asymmetric coordination problems, we illustrate how greater inequality - measured as the divergence in ex post preferences for how coordination occurs - generates a higher equilibrium probability of conflict (measured as the probability of coordination failure). This implies that both players have a higher incentive to employ a (pre-play) coordination mechanism when inequality is more extreme. We then show that pre-play communication can be dominated by pre-play compromise, even when compromise is apparently Pareto inefficient relative to "no compromise" from an ex ante perspective. This is more likely to be true as the inequality between disputants becomes more extreme: as preferences for coordination diminish to zero, compromise eventually dominates all but perfectly reliable communication mechanisms.
Abstract. We present a theory of coordination that compares communication and compromise. Using the "Battle of the Sexes" game as an example of asymmetric coordination problems, we illustrate how greater inequality - measured as the divergence in ex post preferences for how coordination occurs - generates a higher equilibrium probability of conflict (measured as the probability of coordination failure). This implies that both players have a higher incentive to employ a (pre-play) coordination mechanism when inequality is more extreme. We then show that pre-play communication can be dominated by pre-play compromise, even when compromise is apparently Pareto inefficient relative to "no compromise" from an ex ante perspective. This is more likely to be true as the inequality between disputants becomes more extreme: as preferences for coordination diminish to zero, compromise eventually dominates all but perfectly reliable communication mechanisms.
A Theory of 'The Loop' (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden) [pdf]
Abstract. We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to also engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss, and show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power.
Abstract. We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to also engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss, and show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power.