Information Design with Constraints [pdf]
Abstract. Political attacks are the results of strategic decisions by actors who choose how much to learn about the issue at hand and whether to politicize it. How does such endogeneity of information collection affect the frequency of political attacks we observe? Would limiting a party's ability to learn information reduce or increase the attacks? I present a formal model in which two parties with opposite preferences about an outcome decide whether to investigate each other and reveal the truth or remain silent. They receive a public signal before making the decision, and one party - the designer - can strategically choose how accurate this public signal is. Importantly, I compare two versions of the model where (1) the designer can choose any signal and (2) the designer is constrained to choose a binary and symmetric signal. I show that imposing a constraint on the designer's choice of information leads to three differences. First, the constraint generates a strong "collusive obfuscation" where both parties stay silent in equilibrium. Second, it limits the upside to the designer and the downside to the receiver; in particular, the receiver may prefer to have a constrained information designer over receiving perfect information about the state of the world, while he never prefers an unconstrained designer over it. Lastly, parties are willing to give up their initial share of the pie only when the information designer is constrained.
Abstract. Political attacks are the results of strategic decisions by actors who choose how much to learn about the issue at hand and whether to politicize it. How does such endogeneity of information collection affect the frequency of political attacks we observe? Would limiting a party's ability to learn information reduce or increase the attacks? I present a formal model in which two parties with opposite preferences about an outcome decide whether to investigate each other and reveal the truth or remain silent. They receive a public signal before making the decision, and one party - the designer - can strategically choose how accurate this public signal is. Importantly, I compare two versions of the model where (1) the designer can choose any signal and (2) the designer is constrained to choose a binary and symmetric signal. I show that imposing a constraint on the designer's choice of information leads to three differences. First, the constraint generates a strong "collusive obfuscation" where both parties stay silent in equilibrium. Second, it limits the upside to the designer and the downside to the receiver; in particular, the receiver may prefer to have a constrained information designer over receiving perfect information about the state of the world, while he never prefers an unconstrained designer over it. Lastly, parties are willing to give up their initial share of the pie only when the information designer is constrained.
Bargaining for Longevity [pdf]
Revise & Resubmit at American Journal of Political Science
Abstract. I propose a theoretical framework of government coalitions in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability. I particularly focus on the role of dynamic outside options in driving this trade-off and show that the real benefit of being a proposer may not be in the share she appropriates within a coalition but rather in her choice of coalition longevity. The proposer sometimes concedes a large share of the allocation and buys the long-term support of the partner just so that she can be the one to time the dissolution of the coalition. This mechanism helps explain the lack of proposer advantage in portfolio allocation and the relative strength of weak parties discussed in the empirical literature. I further identify conditions under which parties may agree on their choice to use commitment devices.
Revise & Resubmit at American Journal of Political Science
Abstract. I propose a theoretical framework of government coalitions in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability. I particularly focus on the role of dynamic outside options in driving this trade-off and show that the real benefit of being a proposer may not be in the share she appropriates within a coalition but rather in her choice of coalition longevity. The proposer sometimes concedes a large share of the allocation and buys the long-term support of the partner just so that she can be the one to time the dissolution of the coalition. This mechanism helps explain the lack of proposer advantage in portfolio allocation and the relative strength of weak parties discussed in the empirical literature. I further identify conditions under which parties may agree on their choice to use commitment devices.
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden) [pdf]
Revise & Resubmit at American Journal of Political Science
Abstract. We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to also engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss, and show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power.
Revise & Resubmit at American Journal of Political Science
Abstract. We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to also engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss, and show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power.
Coordination in Policymaking (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, which raises the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidize coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest his or her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the communication protocol undermines these incentives.
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, which raises the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidize coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest his or her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the communication protocol undermines these incentives.
A Theory of 'The Loop' (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.