Publications
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden)
Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science
Abstract. We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power. We discuss applications and how the optimal experiment can be implemented in practice.
Working Papers
Strategic Experiments under Regulatory Uncertainty [pdf]
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm has developed a new product but is uncertain about its quality. The firm can acquire more information about the quality of the product, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the firm designs its experiment and the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take unilateral costly action to discover the truth (i.e., reveal the product's quality with certainty). Thus, the firm wants to learn enough to make the optimal choice regarding revealing the true state but also wants to prevent the regulator from knowing too much. In equilibrium, the firm chooses to reveal partial information with a binary experiment. In particular, the firm’s optimal experiment is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to invest in discovering the product's true quality. I then extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product's quality.
Strategic Experiments under Regulatory Uncertainty [pdf]
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm has developed a new product but is uncertain about its quality. The firm can acquire more information about the quality of the product, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the firm designs its experiment and the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take unilateral costly action to discover the truth (i.e., reveal the product's quality with certainty). Thus, the firm wants to learn enough to make the optimal choice regarding revealing the true state but also wants to prevent the regulator from knowing too much. In equilibrium, the firm chooses to reveal partial information with a binary experiment. In particular, the firm’s optimal experiment is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to invest in discovering the product's true quality. I then extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product's quality.
Bargaining for Longevity [pdf]
Under preparation for resubmission
Abstract. I propose a theoretical framework of government coalitions in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability.
I particularly focus on the role of dynamic outside options in driving this trade-off and show that the real benefit of being a proposer may not be in the share she appropriates within a coalition but rather in her choice of coalition longevity.
The proposer sometimes concedes to her partner and buys his long-term support just so that she can be the one to time the dissolution of the coalition. This mechanism lends additional support to the lack of proposer advantage in portfolio allocation as well as the relative strength of weak parties discussed in the empirical literature. I further identify conditions under which parties may agree on their choice to use commitment devices.
Under preparation for resubmission
Abstract. I propose a theoretical framework of government coalitions in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability.
I particularly focus on the role of dynamic outside options in driving this trade-off and show that the real benefit of being a proposer may not be in the share she appropriates within a coalition but rather in her choice of coalition longevity.
The proposer sometimes concedes to her partner and buys his long-term support just so that she can be the one to time the dissolution of the coalition. This mechanism lends additional support to the lack of proposer advantage in portfolio allocation as well as the relative strength of weak parties discussed in the empirical literature. I further identify conditions under which parties may agree on their choice to use commitment devices.
Coordination in Bureaucratic Policymaking (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Reject and Resubmit at American Political Science Review
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, raising the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidized coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the coordination protocol undermines these incentives.
Reject and Resubmit at American Political Science Review
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, raising the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidized coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the coordination protocol undermines these incentives.
A Theory of 'The Loop' (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Work in Progress
Mutual Silence with Informational Constraints
Abstract. I present a formal model in which two political actors with misaligned preferences about an outcome decide whether to attack each other and reveal the truth or remain silent. They receive a public signal before making the decision, and one player - the designer - can strategically choose the structure of the signal. Importantly, I compare two versions of the model where (1) the designer can choose any signal and (2) she chooses under a constraint where the probability of a Type I error must match that of a Type II error. I show that imposing a constraint on the designer's choice of information matters in three ways. First, the constraint generates a strong "collusive obfuscation" where both parties stay silent in equilibrium. Second, it limits the upside to the designer and the downside to the receiver; in particular, the receiver may prefer to have a constrained information designer over receiving perfect information about the state of the world, while he never prefers an unconstrained designer over it.
Lastly, the receiver is significantly more willing to give up his initial share of the pie to "buy the designer's silence" when the information designer is constrained.