Publications
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden)
Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science
Abstract. We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We show that the proposer-optimal can be achieved either by providing no information or with a simple binary experiment. Proposer chooses to reveal partial information when there is sufficient expected misalignment with Vetoer. In this case the opportunity to engage in persuasion strictly benefits Proposer and increases the scope to exercise agenda power. We discuss applications and how the optimal experiment can be implemented in practice.
Working Papers
Strategic Experiments under Regulatory Uncertainty [pdf]
Under Review
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm's product has uncertain social impacts. The firm can acquire more information about this, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take a unilateral costly action to reveal the information with certainty. I show that the firm-optimal can be achieved by providing a binary experiment that is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to take a costly action. I further extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product.
Strategic Experiments under Regulatory Uncertainty [pdf]
Under Review
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm's product has uncertain social impacts. The firm can acquire more information about this, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take a unilateral costly action to reveal the information with certainty. I show that the firm-optimal can be achieved by providing a binary experiment that is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to take a costly action. I further extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product.
Bargaining for Longevity [pdf]
Under Review
Abstract. I propose a theoretical framework of government coalitions in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability.
I particularly focus on the role of dynamic outside options in driving this trade-off and show that the real benefit of being a proposer may not be in the share she appropriates within a coalition but rather in her choice of coalition longevity.
The proposer sometimes concedes to her partner and buys his long-term support just so that she can be the one to time the dissolution of the coalition. This mechanism lends additional support to the lack of proposer advantage in portfolio allocation as well as the relative strength of weak parties discussed in the empirical literature. I further identify conditions under which parties may agree on their choice to use commitment devices.
Under Review
Abstract. I propose a theoretical framework of government coalitions in which a proposer with complete discretion over resource allocation between her and a partner faces a trade-off between immediate gains and long-term stability.
I particularly focus on the role of dynamic outside options in driving this trade-off and show that the real benefit of being a proposer may not be in the share she appropriates within a coalition but rather in her choice of coalition longevity.
The proposer sometimes concedes to her partner and buys his long-term support just so that she can be the one to time the dissolution of the coalition. This mechanism lends additional support to the lack of proposer advantage in portfolio allocation as well as the relative strength of weak parties discussed in the empirical literature. I further identify conditions under which parties may agree on their choice to use commitment devices.
Polarization through Persuasion [pdf]
Abstract. Policy experiments, which provide voters with information about a policy's effectiveness, are often implemented selectively. I propose a theoretical framework that explores the role of strategically designed policy experiments in shaping voter polarization. In the model, a politician seeking to maximize voter support tailors the informativeness of experiments based on her confidence in the policy's effectiveness and the predispositions of different voter groups. I show that this endogenous selection of experimental design intensifies polarization in districts with moderate initial polarization, but conversely reduces polarization in districts that were previously deeply divided. The model further examines the impact of asymmetric group sizes and incomplete voter attention.
Abstract. Policy experiments, which provide voters with information about a policy's effectiveness, are often implemented selectively. I propose a theoretical framework that explores the role of strategically designed policy experiments in shaping voter polarization. In the model, a politician seeking to maximize voter support tailors the informativeness of experiments based on her confidence in the policy's effectiveness and the predispositions of different voter groups. I show that this endogenous selection of experimental design intensifies polarization in districts with moderate initial polarization, but conversely reduces polarization in districts that were previously deeply divided. The model further examines the impact of asymmetric group sizes and incomplete voter attention.
Coordination in Bureaucratic Policymaking (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Under Review
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, raising the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidized coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the coordination protocol undermines these incentives.
Under Review
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, raising the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidized coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the coordination protocol undermines these incentives.
A Theory of 'The Loop' (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.